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Abstract
Artificial agents, of the kind studied in AI, are typically oriented to the realization of
an externally assigned task and try to optimize over secondary aspects of plan execution
such time lapse or power consumption, technically displaying a quasi-dichotomous prefer-
ence relation. Boolean games have been developed as a paradigm for modelling societies of
agents with this type of preference. In boolean games agents exercise control over propo-
sitional variables and strive to achieve a goal formula whose realization might require the
opponents’ cooperation. Recently, a theory of incentive engineering for such games has
been devised, where an external authority steers the outcome of the game towards certain
desirable properties consistent with players’ goals, by imposing a taxation mechanism on
the players that makes the outcomes that do not comply with those properties less ap-
pealing to them. The present contribution stems from a complementary perspective and
studies, instead, how games with quasi-dichotomous preferences can be transformed from
inside, rather than from outside, by endowing players with the possibility of sacrificing a
part of their payoff received at a certain outcome in order to convince other players to play
a certain strategy. Concretely we explore the properties of endogenous games with goals,
obtained coupling strategic games with goals, a generalization of boolean games, with
the machinery of endogenous games coming from game theory. We analyze equilibria in
those structures, showing the preconditions needed for desirable outcomes to be achieved
without external intervention. Finally, making use of taxation mechanism as introduced
in the literature, we show how to transform these structures in such a way that desirable
outcomes can be realized even when side-payments are allowed. What our results show is
that endogenous games with goals display specific irreducible features — with respect to
what already known for endogenous games — which makes them worth studying in their
own sake.
1 Introduction
A characteristic feature of agents, the kind of artificial entities studied in AI, is that of being
goal-oriented [NSS59, RN09, Cas98, CC95], directed to the realization of certain desirable
states of affairs, typically externally assigned, disregarding secondary factors, such as amount
of resources spent or monetary rewards received, whenever they hinder a goal state to obtain.
As a consequence of this, an agent does not automatically respond to incentives, as an eco-
nomic actor would, but displays a typical quasi-dichotomous preference relation over possible
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outcomes, i.e., it compares states looking at the realization of their own goal first, and only
then at efficiency levels.
A well-known model of a society of goal-directed agents heavily investigated in AI is
boolean games [HvdHMW01], a compact and computationally desirable representation of
strategic interaction by means of logical formulas. In boolean games agents exercise control
over propositional variables and strive to achieve a goal formula whose realization might
require the opponents’ cooperation, disregarding the cost associated to each action, if need
be.
Recently a theory of incentive engineering has been devised [WEKL13], where an exter-
nal authority, i.e., the principal, steers the outcome of the game towards certain desirable
properties, by imposing a taxation mechanism on the players 1 that makes the outcomes that
do not comply with those properties less appealing to them. However, that of a principal
turns out to be a non-trivial task as, due to preference quasi-dichotomy, there is no monetary
compensation that can convince agents to give up their goal. In all the other cases, though,
players behave as cost-minimizers and desirable systemic properties satisfying players’ goals
have been shown to be implementable by the appropriate system of incentives.
The present contribution 2 stems from a complementary perspective and studies, instead,
how games with quasi-dichotomous preferences can be transformed from inside, rather than
from outside, by endowing players with the possibility of sacrificing a part of their payoff
received at a certain outcome in order to convince other players to play a certain strat-
egy. Concretely we explore the properties of endogenous games with goals, obtained coupling
strategic games with goals, a generalization of boolean games [HvdHMW01, WEKL13], with
the machinery of endogenous games coming from game theory [JW05]. We analyze equilib-
ria in these novel structures, showing the preconditions needed for desirable outcomes to be
achieved without external intervention . We illustrate our idea and, informally, our setting in
the following example.
Motivating example Consider two players, a and b, which can decide whether two light
switches sa and sb are on or off. Let us assume player a to be in full control of sa, player b
of sb, and that each player is unaware of the other player’s final decision. Let us also assume
that players have goals and actions have costs, in particular that a wants sb to be on, that
b wants both sa and sb to be on, and that the cost of turning sa on is 5, of turning it off is
4, while the cost of turning sb either on or off is 2. Finally, we assume that players always
prefer to minimize the cost of the actions they take and that they always prefer outcomes
satisfying their goal to outcomes that do not. It goes without saying that in a scenario of this
kind player a, being indifferent between having sa on or off, will simply look at the resulting
costs and decide to turn the switch off. Likewise, player b will turn the switch on and this
fact will not impose on him any extra cost. In the end, player a will have her goal satisfied,
paying a cost of 4, while b will not, paying 2.
Suppose though that, before the game starts, players can commit to bear a part of the cost
the opponent is incurring in at a certain outcome, should that outcome be reached. While
in the previous scenario player b, although depending on the other player for the realization
of his goal (cfr. [BLSL09] for a qualitative account of dependencies in boolean games and
1The term player, mutuated from game theory, and the term agent, mutuated from AI, will be used
interchangeably.
2This paper generalizes and significantly extends [Tur13].
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[GT12b] for strategic games), could not have any say on a’s decision-making, now he can
adopt a richer strategy and offer a to bear some cost of sa being on, say 3, before a takes
any decision. In the resulting situation both a and b will have their goal satisfied, a bearing a
cost of 2 while b of 5, which is a more satisfactory solution for both players. Notice, however,
that the solution is not stable, as player b has an incentive to deviate to more parsimonious
offers in the pre-play phase without compromising the realization of his own goal.
The added value of the analysis presented here, intuitively introduced in the example
above, is two-fold:
• it complements the framework of incentive engineering for boolean games [WEKL13],
studying those situations in which players can reach desirable properties without external
intervention;
• it provides a quantitative resolution to dependence relations, broadly studied for the
case of boolean games [BLSL09][BLSLZ09], allowing players to influence each other’s
decision-making by the offer of monetary incentive.
We carry out the analysis studying the general setting of endogenous games with goals,
in relation with both boolean games and endogenous games, focussing on the properties of
the resulting equilibria.
Paper Structure In Section 2 we introduce strategic games with goals, studying their for-
mal connection with related contributions in the game theory and AI literature, i.e., strategic
(normal form) games and boolean games. In Section 3 we study endogenous games with
goals, adding to strategic games with goals the dynamics brought into play by the possibility
of exchanging side-payments in the pre-play phase. In Section 4 we carry out an equilib-
rium analysis of these structures, showing results of pure strategy equilibrium survival and
discussing the connection with what known from game theory. In Section 5 we integrate side-
payments with taxation mechanisms, devising a procedure that ensures desirable properties to
be reached. Section 6 studies a variant of quasi-dichotomous preferences with a lexicographic
order over mixed strategies, discussing the connection with the standard utility function of
normal form games. Finally, in Section 7 we wrap up the work pointing to possible future
research directions.
2 Strategic games and quasi-dichotomous preferences
In this section we describe a general approach to characterizing goal-directed artificial agents
acting in a common shared world. We do so by explicitly enriching a strategic game with a
distinguished set of goals, one for each agent.
As well-known, a strategic (normal form) game S is a tuple (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), where N is a
set of players, Σi a set of strategies for player i and pi :
∏
i∈N Σi ×N → R a payoff function,
assigning to each player his payoff at each strategy profile. Henceforth we abbreviate pi(σ, i)
as pii(σ),
∏
i∈N Σi as Σ, — extending the conventions to similar cases —and denote NE(S)
the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of strategic game S, with NE∆(S) being its mixed
extension.
Strategic games with goals are defined as follows.
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Definition 1 (Strategic games with goals) A strategic game with goals is a tuple (S, {Gi}i∈N )
where S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) is a strategic game and each Gi ⊆ Σ is a set of goal states for
player i.
Intuitively a goal is a state of the game the agent is directed to and, when given the
possibility, would not want to trade for a non-goal state, no matter what the payoff assigned
by the function pi is.
If we think of each agent as associated to a colour, we obtain a particularly intuitive
representation of strategic games with goals, where goal states for each agent are assigned
the agent’s colour. The algebra of goal states is defined by operation on colours, e.g. a goal
state shared by a blue player and red player is represented as a purple state. Figure 1 is an
example of how strategic games with goals can be displayed.
L R
U 3, 3 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
Figure 1: Players’ goals. Column wants the game to end up in the set {(L,D), (R,D)}, Row
in the set {(R,D)}. The coalition {Column,Row} wants the shared outcome (R,D) to be
realized. As a convention, Row obtains the first component in the displayed payoff vectors,
Column the second.
2.1 Quasi-dichotomous preferences
We stress it once more: goal states represent those outcomes that are of utter importance for
an agent. In particular, when confronted between the choice of a goal state and a non-goal
state, the agent will always elect to choose the goal state, even if this amounts to giving up
secondary rewards, expressed by the payoff function. When goal realization is however not an
issue, secondary aspects play a role and the agent will always try to maximize the resulting
payoff.
This fact induces what is technically called quasi-dichotomy of a preference relation
[WEKL13]: there is a distinguished set of states that is better for an agent than all the
others (the goal states) and will remain so, independently of money transfers. Both goal
states and non-goal states can in any case be ordered looking at the payoff that each player
is associated to.
Clearly, preference quasi-dichotomy could be implemented in many ways. The first that
comes to mind is that of working with truly lexicographic preferences [Rub06], i.e., states
being identified with a tuple (x, n) where x ∈ {0, 1} and n ∈ R, the first entry encoding
whether the state is a goal state or not and the second entry encoding secondary materialistic
aspects. Therefore, a state z is to be preferred to a state z′ whenever z ≥LEX z′, where ≥LEX
is the lexicographic order between the two. Under this interpretation, goal states are de facto
assigned an infinite payoff, which makes them better than a non-goal state no matter what
the payoff of the latter is.
It is well-known that both games with lexicographic preferences and games with infinite
utility do not have a corresponding von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation [Wil96,
Kno03, LBD91, Rub06] and the resulting games do not in general display fundamental game-
theoretical properties, such as existence of Nash equilibria. Furthermore, games with infinite
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utility rule out the possibility of having standard expected utility to begin with and games
with lexicographic preferences allow only for non-standard versions thereof. Section 6 will
carry out an in-depth analysis of these non-standard ways of dealing with quasi-dichotomy,
showing how even natural representations of mixed strategies cannot be analyzed within the
framework of normal form games, preventing therefore a comparison with well-known setups
coming from game theory, e.g. [JW05].
To overcome these problems we study a generalization of boolean games with costs (as in-
troduced in [WEKL13] and analyzed further in [Tur13]) which are instead game-representable.
Concretely, we define a family of boost factors Ωi, one for each player i, each of which encodes
how much more a player values a certain goal state with respect to a non-goal state. In other
words, a boost factor is a measure of the relative distance that, at each game, a certain goal
state for an agent finds itself with respect to all other non-goal states. Notice that boost
factors are mechanisms to ensure that goal states remain better than non-goal states, but
they implicitly also give a measure of the risk that a player is willing to undertake to achieve
a goal state, i.e., they encode a preference relations over mixed profiles containing both goal
states and non-goal states.
Technically, for a given strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ), a boost factor is a
function ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i : R→ R associating to each payoff how much this payoff is boosted if it
is the payoff of a goal state. Properties required by boost factors are the following.
Let x, y ∈ R and (S, {Gi}i∈N ) be a strategic game with goals.
Each ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i : R→ R is required to be such that:
ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x) ≥ ω(S,{Gi}i∈N )i (y) if and only if x ≥ y (1)
Intuitively, if a state x is weakly preferred by i to a state y for its secondary aspect then it
remains so whenever both x and y satisfy i’s goal.
ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x) > pii(σ) for all σ 6∈ Gi (2)
Intuitively, satisfying a goal is always better than not satisfying it.
A strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ) associated to profile of boost factors ω ∈ Ω =∏
i∈N Ωi is said to be instantiated by ω, and this is denoted (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω). Intuitively,
when playing (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) each agent i judges the betterness of goal states according to
the boost factor ωi. Here is the definition of utility taking them into account.
Definition 2 (Utility) Let (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) be a strategic game with goals instantiated by a
profile of boost factors ω with S = (N,Σ, pi). The utility function u(S,{Gi}i∈N )(ω) : N×Σ→ R
assigning to each player the payoff u
(S,{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
i (σ) he receives at outcome σ is defined as
follows.
u
(S,{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
i (σ) =

ω(pii(σ)) if σ ∈ Gi
pii(σ) otherwise
So, the function u is constructed by the combination of pi and ω, i.e., the payoff function
and the profile of boost factor, respectively. The latter takes care of the fact that goal states
are always better than non-goal states, no matter what the payoff is associated to the latter
by the function pi.
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We would like at this point to clarify the possible conceptual ambiguity that might arise
from having two different functions, pi and u, which associate a vector of numerical values to
each outcome. The function pi, which we will always refer to as a payoff function, encodes
the secondary, intuitively purely monetary, aspects of a certain state. The function u instead,
which we will always refer to as a utility function, incorporates the primary aspects, i.e.,
goal realization, possibly associated to a state. Thereby, a state might have (relatively) high
utility and (relatively) low payoff, if for instance the state satisfies a goal, but it might also
have (relatively) low utility and (relatively) high payoff, if for instance it is the only state not
satisfying a goal.
It is also worth noticing that boost factors allow us to reason about hypothetical utility
distributions (all the real numbers that are not occurring as payoffs in the game). This
extremely important feature will be fully exploited later on, as the role of boost factors is not
only to declare that goal states are better, but, again, to keep them so independently of any
monetary compensation.
For a given strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ), with S = (N,Σ, pi), and instantiated
with boost factor profile ω, the induced strategic game is the game S ′ = (N,Σ, u), where
u is calculated according to Definition 2.
Figure 2 shows how.
L R
U −3,−3 0,−5
D −5, 0 −1,−1
pii(σ)⇒ ui(σ)
L R
U −3,−3 0,−5
D −5, 1 3, 0
Figure 2: From a strategic game with goals to its induced strategic game: each agent’s boost
factor assigns +3 to all his goal states with respect to his best non-goal state, maintaining
the relative distance among goal states. For example, the reason why Column is getting 1 at
outcome (D,L) of the induced strategic game is because he is getting 0 at outcome (D,R)
— which is in turn because −3 is the payoff of his best non-goal state and −3 + 3 = 0 — and
the original relative distance between (D,R) and (D,L) is of 1.
2.1.1 Expected Utility
We introduce an extra novel feature with respect to the standard treatment of boolean games:
we allow players to randomize over possible strategies. This will make it possible to draw a
comparison with the equilibrium existence results known for endogenous games, which rely
on Nash’s theorem, the well-known result on the existence of Nash equilibria with mixed
strategies in normal form games [OR94, Nas50]. To compute expected utility we first denote
∆(Σi) the set of probability distributions over the strategies of player i and, for δ ∈ ∆(Σi),
we denote δ(σi) the probability that mixed strategy profile δ assigns to σi ∈ Σ. We call
the set s(δ) = {σi ∈ Σi | δ(σi) > 0} the support of δ.
Definition 3 (Expected Utility) Let δ be a mixed strategy profile available at strategic
game S with a payoff function pi, σ ∈ s(δ) a pure strategy profile in the support of δ, and δ(σ)
the probability of σ to occur according to δ. The expected utility of δ for player i is defined
as follows.
Ei(δ) =
∑
σ∈s(δ)
pii(σ)δ(σ)
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To compute the expected utility on a strategic game with goals, instantiated with a boost
factor, we compute the expected utility in its induced strategic game.
2.1.2 Boolean games
An instance of strategic games with goals are boolean games.
Definition 4 (Boolean Games) A boolean game is a tuple
(N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N )
where:
• N is a finite set of players;
• Φ a finite set of propositional atoms; c : N × V → R+ is a cost function, associating
to each player the cost he incurs in when some valuation v ∈ V of the atoms Φ obtains;
• γi is a boolean formula, constructed on the set Φ, denoting the goal of player i;
• Φi ⊆ Φ is the nonempty set of atoms controlled by player i. As standard [vdHW05], we
assume that for j 6= i, Φi ∩ Φj = ∅ and that
⋃{Φi | i ∈ N} = Φ, i.e., controlled atoms
partition the whole space.
A choice of player i is a function vi : Φi → {tt,ff}, representing player i’s decision to
set the atoms he controls to either true or false . We denote Vi as the set of possible choices
of player i. An outcome v ∈ ∏i∈N Vi of the boolean game B is a collection of choices,
one per player. An outcome induces a valuation function, assigning a boolean value to each
propositional atom [vdHW05]. Therefore, we denote V =
∏
i∈N Vi the set of all possible
valuation functions and, for v ∈ V and ϕ being a boolean formula constructed on Φ, we write
v |= ϕ (resp. v 6|= ϕ) to say that ϕ holds (resp. does not hold) under the valuation v. When
a formula ϕ is satisfied by a unique valuation, we use vϕ to denote that valuation.
The utility in boolean games is calculated using a boost factor µi, with µi = maxv∈V (ci(v)),
selecting the payoff of the worst outcome that can happen to player i, i.e., the updated valu-
ation that is most costly to him, and adding it to the goal states, together with a sufficiently
small real .
u
β(B)
i (v) =

+ µi − ci(v) if v |= γi
−ci(v) otherwise
Figure 3 shows an example of this translation.
sC ¬sC
sR 3, 3 0, 5
¬sR 5, 0 1, 1
ci(v)⇒ ui(v)
sC ¬sC
sR −3,−3 0,−5
¬sR −5, 6 5, 5
Figure 3: From a boolean game to its induced strategic game. Each player i is endowed with
boost factor µi.
When constructing a strategic game starting from a given boolean game we soon realize the
downside of the two main restrictions — otherwise extremely desirable from a computational
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point of view — differentiating boolean games from the larger class of strategic game with
goals:
• The number of strategies agents can play are always, 2n for some natural number n,
which can vary for each agent;
• The relative distance between goal states and non-goal states is given by the µ+1 boost
factor, which is fixed for each agent.
The first constraint is not particularly restrictive, but it shows an intuitive difference
between boolean games and strategic games with goals: while in boolean games players fully
control propositional variables — i.e., they can always decide whether to set them to true
or false — strategic games with goals can be thought of as a sort of boolean games with
admissible valuation functions, and thereby more general structures. The second constraint is
somewhat more restrictive, as the choice of the µ+1 boost factor is extremely committal and
bears a number of consequences especially if we take utility to be transferable, as we do in
our framework. µ+ 1 is a regret-based (or even pride-based) boost factor: the worse non-goal
states are for an agent, the higher the payoff at his goal states; the factor is independent of
the actual numerical value assigned by the cost function, i.e., it does not vary along with the
absolute values of its domain; what is more, it is fixed for all players, i.e., all players apply
exactly the same distance to separate goal states and non-goal states.
These are among the reasons why we think that the more general approach allowed by
strategic games with goals is in order, which incorporates the important features of the µ+ 1
class but leaves also space for more variety.
2.2 Representation results
The following results establish correspondences between strategic games, strategic games with
goals and boolean games.
Proposition 5 (Strategic games with goals and strategic games) s
1. Let (S, {Gi}i∈N ) with S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic game with goals and ω a profile
of boost factors. There exists a strategic game S ′ = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) such that, for each
σ ∈∏i∈N Σi and each i ∈ N , we have that u(S,{Gi}i∈N )(ω)i (σ) = pi′(σ).
2. Let S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic game. Then there exists a strategic game with
goals (S ′, {G}i) with S ′ = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) such that, for all profiles of boost factors ω,
for each σ ∈∏i∈N Σi and each i ∈ N , u(S,{Gi}i∈N )(ω)i (σ) = pi′(σ).
Proof.
For the first item, start out with a strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ), with S =
(N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), and a boost factor profile ω. The strategic game S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) with
u
(S,{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
i (σ) = pi
′(σ) for each σ ∈∏i∈N Σi and each i ∈ N is immediate to construct.
For the second item, consider the strategic game S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) and construct the
strategic game with goals (S ′, {G}i) with S ′ = S and for each i ∈ N , set Gi = ∅. It follows
that for all profiles of boost factors ω we have that for each σ ∈ ∏i∈N Σi and each i ∈ N ,
u
(S,{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
i (σ) = pi
′(σ).
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Proposition 6 (Strategic games and boolean games) s
1. Let B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ) be a boolean game. Then there exist a strategic
game S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) and a bijective function f : V →
∏
i∈N Σi such that for all
i, uBi (v) = pii(f(v)).
2. Let S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic game such that, for each i ∈ N there is n ∈ N\{0}
with |Σi| = 2n . Then there exist a boolean game B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ), a
k ∈ N, and a bijective function f : V →∏i∈N Σi such that for all i, uBi (v) = pii(f(v))−k.
Proof.
For the first item, simply construct a strategic game such that f is a bijection and then
set each pii(f(v)) to return the value given by u
B
i (v). For the second one, pick again f to be
bijection, and, for a sufficiently large k ∈ N, set each γi to ⊥ — i.e., p ∧ ¬p for some p ∈ Φi
— and each uBi (v) to pii(f(v))− k.
Proposition 7 (Strategic games with goals and boolean games) s
1. Let B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ) be a boolean game. Then there exist a strategic game
with goals (S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), Gi) and a bijective function f : V →
∏
i∈N Σi such that
for all i, uBi (v) = ui(f(v)).
2. Let (S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), Gi) be a strategic game such that, for each i ∈ N there is n ∈
N\{0} with |Σi| = 2n . Then there exist a boolean game B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ),
a k ∈ N, and a bijective function f : V →∏i∈N Σi such that for all i, uBi (v) = ui(f(v))−
k.
Proof. Direct consequence of the definitions and the previous two results.
All in all, strategic games with goals and strategic games display a straightforward corre-
spondence. Modulo some minor requirements, this is also true for boolean games. Moreover,
the proofs allow us to talk about the boolean/strategic game (with goals) corresponding to
a boolean/strategic game (with goals), and provide automatic procedures to translate among
these classes.
The reader might at this stage understandably be puzzled. We have introduced strategic
games with goals, an alleged generalization of strategic games, showing that, in the end, the
two structures are substantially equivalent. The rest of the paper, in what we believe is its
main contribution, is devoted to showing that the introduction of dynamic operations, such
as the possibility of side-payments in a pre-play phase, brings to light the striking differences
between these structures.
3 Endogenous games and quasi-dichotomous preferences
Endogenous games [JW05] have been introduced as an extension of normal form games with
a pre-play negotiation phase, where players have the possibility, before the game starts, to
spend the amount of utility received at certain outcomes to influence their opponents’ decision-
making.
This section imports the ideas and the techniques of endogenous games to games with
quasi-dichotomous preferences and it shows that, in spite of the static representation results
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of the previous section, the presence of goal states does make a difference when side-payments
are allowed.
Following [JW05] 3 we enrich a strategic game with a family {Ti}i∈N where, for each
player i, Ti is a set of functions of the form τi : Σ×N → R+, such that τi(σ, i) = 0 for each
σ ∈∏i∈N Σi. Each such function specifies how much payoff player i secures the other players
in case some particular outcome obtains. We call each τ ∈∏i∈N τi a transfer function and
a tuple (S, {Ti}i∈N ) an endogenous game. An endogenous game with goals is defined
in the expected way, i.e., as a tuple ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N ) where (S, {Gi}i∈N ) is a strategic
game with goals and (S, {Ti}i∈N ) is an endogenous game.
It is useful to think of an endogenous game (with goals) as a game consisting of two phases:
• A pre-play phase, where players simultaneously decide on their transfers to the other
players;
• An actual game play, where the utility of the starting game is updated taking the
selected transfers into account.
Definition 8 (Update by side-payments) Let S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic game
and let τ be a transfer function. The play of τ in S is the strategic game τ(S) = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′)
where, for σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ N ,
pi′i(σ) = pii(σ) +
∑
j∈N
τj(σ, i)−
∑
j∈N
τi(σ, j)
In a nutshell, when a game is updated by a transfer function each player:
• adds to his payoff at each outcome all the transfers that he receives from the other
players at that outcome;
• subtracts from his payoff at each outcome all the transfers he makes to the other players
at that outcome.
Let E = ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N ) be an endogenous game with goals and let E(ω) be its
instantiation with the boost factor profile ω4. A pair (τ, σ), for τ being a transfer function and
σ a strategy profile available at S, is a solution of E if there is a strategy in the two-phase
game that is a subgame perfect equilibrium and where (τ, σ) is played on the equilibrium
path. In other words in order for a pair (τ, σ) to be a solution of an endogenous game with
goals E = (S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) we require that there exists a strategy for E(ω), i.e., a
specification of a strategy profile σ′ for the actual game play after every transfer function τ ′,
such that:
1. (τ, σ) is a Nash Equilibrium in the two-phase game;
3While the approach to game transformation by side-payments adopted here [JW05] provides an elegant
technical framework that well suits strategic games with goals, we remind the reader of the existence of earlier
related work in the game theory literature [Gut78], [Kal81], [Far98]. Also, a more involved model of pre-
play negotiations in non-cooperative games, overcoming a number of limitations of [JW05], has recently been
developed [GT12a].
4The calculation of the utility after a transfer function has occurred is carried out as expected, i.e., in the
updated strategic games with goals instantiated by ω.
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2. for every (τ ′, σ′) in the strategy specification, σ′ is a Nash-equilibrium in every subgame
τ ′(S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) of the two-phase game.
Subgame perfect equilibria rule out incredible threats [OR94], in our case the fact that
some transfers might be discouraged by the play of strategies that are dominated after the
transfers in question are made.
For a solution (τ, σ) of E = ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N ) instantiated with ω we say that σ is
a surviving equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium of (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω).
We also impose, for purposes that will result clear later on, that strategies are uniform
modulo positive affine transformations [OR94], i.e., players make the same choices in two
games S and S ′ where S ′ is obtained from S via positive affine transformation. In other
words, players play the same strategy in games that are practically identical. We call this
requirement strategy uniformity, an example of which is given in Figure 4.
L R
U 2, 2 0, 0
D 0, 0 1, 1
L R
U 3, 3 1, 1
D 1, 1 2, 2
Figure 4: Strategy uniformity: if a strategy profile is chosen in the game on the left side, then
there is no reason for players to deviate from this choice in the game to the right side.
3.1 Boost factors and game update
When a pre-play phase precedes a strategic game with goals instantiated with a family of
boost factors, we need to understand how the boost factors react to the game update. In
particular, if boost factors are to encode a relative distance between goal states and non-goal
states, we do want these changes to be reflected in the dynamics introduced by the possibility
of side-payments.
To do so, we indicate ω(S,{Gi}i∈N ) the boost factor applied to game (S, {Gi}i∈N ) and omit
the superscript when obvious. We indicate with Ω ↑ the set of all boost factors satisfying the
following property, under the assumption that pi is the payoff function of S and pi′ of S ′:
ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x) ≥ ω(S
′,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x)⇔ ∃σ 6∈ Gi such that ∀σ′ 6∈ G′i, pii(σ) ≥ pi′i(σ′) (3)
What the definition says is that, fixing a boost factor, the utility of goal states is pushed
upwards the higher the payoff non-goal states yield. It is pushed downwards otherwise. This
property, as well as the following other, becomes extremely relevant for our purposes when
S ′ = τ(S), for a given transfer function τ .
We will also consider a different type of boost factor, modelling players that value more
goal states the further away they are from the worst possible outcome they could end up
in. It is the regret-based boost factor that generalizes the µ factor typical of boolean games
[WEKL13]. We indicate with Ω ↓ the set of all boost factor profiles satisfying the following
property:
ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x) ≥ ω(S
′,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x)⇔ ∃σ 6∈ Gi such that ∀σ′ 6∈ G′i, pii(σ) ≤ pi′i(σ′) (4)
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What the definition says is that, fixing a boost factor, the utility of goal states is pushed
upwards the lower the payoff non-goal states yield. It is pushed downwards otherwise.
As we will see later, having a boost factor profile in the set Ω ↓ makes a huge difference
in players’ strategic behaviour, as players can deliberately strive to increase their cost at
non-goal states for the sole reason of increasing their payoff at goal states.
Unless otherwise specified we consider boost factor profiles in the set Ω ↑.
3.2 Budget constraints
We also consider strategic games with goals where players have a budget constraint, i.e., a
limit to the amount of payoff they can end up gaining as a result of the pre-play phase.
Intuitively, for S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) being a strategic game, each player i is associated a
budget constraint bi : Σ→ R, with bi(σ) ≥ pii(σ), for each σ ∈ Σ.
Clearly many transfer functions exist that, applied to a starting strategic game, violate a
given budget constraint for some player. Rather than declaring them outright inadmissible
and ruling them out from the model, we introduce a uniform punishment to all players if such
transfer functions are played. By doing so, we will still be able to talk about violation of the
budget constraint requirement and of situations in which players can rationally decide to rule
out such profiles.
The definition of utility of endogenous games instantiated with a boost factor profile
ω and budget constraints {bi}i∈N is given below. To avoid clutter of notation we denote
(S, G)(ω, bS) the instantiation of strategic game S endowed with the family of goals {Gi}i∈N
boost factors {ωi}i∈N and the family of budget constraints {bSi }i∈N defined on S and omit
superscripts and subscripts whenever possible.
Definition 9 (Utility with budget constraints) Let (S ′, G)(ω, b) be an instantiated strate-
gic game with goals and  ∈ R+ a sufficiently small positive real. Let moreover S = τ(S ′)
for some strategic game S ′ and transfer function τ , and let pi the payoff function of S. The
utility function u(S,G)(ω,bS
′
) is defined as follows.
u
(S,G)(ω,bS′ )
i (σ) =

ω(pii(σ))− |D|κ if σ ∈ Gi
pii(σ)− |D|κ otherwise
where κ = max{0,−min{pii(σ) − bi(σ) | σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ N}} and |D| = {i ∈ N |
(pii(σ)− bi(σ)) = κ for some σ ∈ Σ}
The difference with Definition 14 is the subtraction of the κ factor to the players’ payoff.
This factor makes a difference only if there exists some player and some outcome where the
player exceeds his budget constraints as a result of the pre-play phase. Then κ is given the
value of the highest excess in the game, i.e., the highest amount of payoff that a player has
exceeded at some outcome. κ is multiplied by the number of players |D| that simultaneously
exceed the threshold by this highest amount.
At first one might think that players can exceed their budget constraint strategically,
i.e., their might be situations in which players might find it rational to play strategies that
deliberately go beyond the limit imposed by their constraint for instance in order to punish
the other players. The following proposition shows that this is never an equilibrium strategy.
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Proposition 10 Let x = (τ, σ) be a subgame perfect equilibrium of the endogenous game
with goals E = ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) with budget constraints {bi}i∈N on S. Then the
punishment factor of (τ(S), {Gi}i∈N ))(ω) equals 0.
Proof.
Suppose not. Then there exist a set of players I and a strategy profile σ∗ where, for each
i ∈ I, pii(σ∗)−bi(σ∗) = κ > 0 holds in τ(S). Fix now a player j 6∈ I and let κj < κ the maximal
excess of player j at τ(S). Now, by strategy uniformity, player i is better off deviating to a
transfer function (τ∗i , τ−i) where τ
∗
i (j, σ
′) = τi(j, σ′) +
κ−κj
2 for each σ
′ as, notice, (τ∗i , τ−i)(S)
can be obtained from τ(S) via positive affine transformation and the punishment factor in
(τ∗i , τ−i)(S) is strictly smaller than |D|k . As a consequence, the play of σ in (τ∗i , τ−i)(S)
yields player i a strictly better payoff.
As we will see next, budget constraints allow for a neat connection with the endogenous
boolean games studied in [Tur13].
Dynamic asymmetries The reader may have wondered what the difference actually is
between strategic games with goals and strategic games. After all, we have shown a rather
straightforward correspondence between the two structures in Section 2.
The following proposition is a hint of the fact that the similarity between them is not as
obvious as the previous results might suggest. Concretely, when introduce dynamic operations
that update the game (such as side-payments), the correspondence ceases to exist.
Proposition 11 (Dynamic asymmetry) Let (S, {Gi}i∈N ) with S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a
strategic game with goals, ω a boost factor profile, τ0, τ ′ be two transfer functions, S0,S ′ the
strategic games corresponding to τ0(S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) and τ ′(S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω), respectively. It is
not necessarily the case that τ ′(S0) = S ′.
Proof.
Consider the strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ) where S = ({A,B}, {Σi}i∈N , pi),
GB = ∅, GA = {σ∗A, σ∗B}, pii(σ) = 0 for all i ∈ N, σ ∈ Σ and |ΣA| = |ΣB| = 2. Consider the
transfer functions τ0 and τ ′ such that τ ′A(σ,B) = 2, for all σ 6∈ GA while τ ′A(σ∗, B) = 0 and
τ ′B(σ,A) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ. Notice now u(τ
0(S),{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
A (σ
∗) = ω(τ
0(S),{Gi}i∈N )
A (0) > 0, that
u
(τ ′(S),{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
A (σ
∗) = ω(τ
′(S),{G}i)(ω)
A (−2) > −2 and that ω(τ
′(S),{G}i)(ω)
A (−2) < 0 . σ∗ yields
player A a payoff x ≥ 0 in τ ′(S0) but not in S ′.
From the last proposition we gather that updating strategic games with goals by means of
side-payments— but a similar argument extends to boolean games with incentives [WEKL13]
in a straightforward fashion — destroys the direct correspondence with strategic games. The
reason lies on the fact that the utility function is calculated in such a way that a player gets
a boosted payoff in outcomes satisfying his goal, but always relative to the value yielded by
the non-goal states. The results in the next section will show that this imbalance bears heavy
consequences in terms of equilibrium analysis.
3.3 Relation of side-payments with payoffs and their dynamics
This part looks at the relation between side-payments and their effect on payoffs, zooming in
the relation with taxation mechanisms, of the type studied in the related literature [WEKL13].
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Side-payments and payoffs
Proposition 12 (Normalization) Let (S, {Gi}i∈N ) with S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic
game with goals, ω be a profile of boost factors, {bi}i∈N a family of budget constraints on S and
τ a transfer function on S. Then there is a strategic game with goals (S ′, {Gi}i∈N ) with S ′ =
(N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) such that, for all i ∈ N and σ ∈ Σ, we have that u(τ(S),{Gi}i∈N )(ω,{bi}i∈N )i (σ) =
u
(τ0(S′),{Gi}i∈N )(ω,{bi}i∈N )
i (σ).
Proof. Let S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), τ be a transfer function on S, ω be a profile of boost
factors, and let κ be the punishment factor associated to τ(S) by the family of budget con-
straints {bi}i∈N . Let S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) be a game different from S only in the payoff
function and let pi′i(σ) = pii(σ)+
∑
j∈N τj(σ, i)−
∑
j∈N τi(σ, j)−κ. We have that for all i ∈ N
and σ ∈ Σ, u(τ(S),{Gi}i∈N )(ω,{bi}i∈N )i (σ) = u(τ
0(S′),{Gi}i∈N )(ω,{bi}i∈N )
i (σ).
In a nutshell, we can think of transfer functions as payoff modifiers. As we will see, the
setting of strategic games with goals allows to explicitly strategise over payoffs by a rational
use of side-payments, rather than taking them as immutable factor in a game.
Side-payments and taxes Wooldridge et al. [WEKL13] define taxation mechanisms on
a boolean game B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ) as functions αi : V → R+ where every player
receives a monetary sanction at each particular outcome.
We employ this notion for the more general framework of strategic games with goals,
defining them as functions αi : Σ → R+, subtracting the taxes received from a player at a
certain outcome to his payoff.
To ease the connection with our previous definitions we introduce the strategic game α(S),
i.e., the game S to which the taxation mechanism α = ∏i∈N αi is applied, as the strategic
game (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) where for each i ∈ N, σ ∈ Σ we have that pi′i(σ) = pii(v)− αi(σ).
Transfer functions and taxation mechanisms are of a rather different kind. While the for-
mer ones consist of payoff redistributions among players at certain outcomes, without adding
or subtracting to the players’ total payoff, the latter ones explicitly inject new sanctions into
the system to modify players’ decision-making. However, in a technical sense, we can always
find a taxation mechanism having the same effect of a transfer function on an underlying
game.
Proposition 13 (From side-payments to taxes) Let (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) be a strategic game
and τ a transfer function. There exists a taxation mechanism α such that NE(τ(S)) =
NE(α(S)).
Proof. Straightforward.
Proposition 13 shows that, in some respect, taxation mechanisms can simulate transfer
functions. It must however be said that simulations of this kind only make sense when both
taxation mechanisms and transfers functions are fixed. But unlike taxation mechanisms, that
are decided externally, transfer functions bear further strategic considerations. As made clear
in the motivating example, it is not enough to establish that a transfer function induces
equilibria in the resulting game, but we also need to establish whether the transfer function
itself is part of a larger equilibrium, i.e., whether players are not better off by switching to
different transfers.
14
3.4 Endogenous Boolean Games
As we have observed, preference quasi-dichotomy in boolean games is modelled using a boost
factor µi for states satisfying player i’s goal, which gets his utility increased adding to the
payoff already associated to each such state the cost and the taxes he would get at his worst
possible outcome. As costs and taxes are never negative, this leads players’ utility to be
maximal at goal states. The µi factor is a classical case of regret-based boost factor — i.e., it
belongs to Ω↓ — and, as the reader will have noticed, the expression −βi(v), describing the
net gain that player i obtains from the transfer function β at v, can exceed ci(v), i.e., the cost
i is incurring in at v. This means that, using side-payments, players might incur in de facto
negative costs for performing certain actions and, consequently, the boost factor associated
to goal states might also be negative, disrupting preference quasi-dichotomy. To avoid this
drawback we use budget constraints and, as usual, we impose that after a transfer is made,
each game undergoes a positive affine transformation, where each valuation v is assigned an
extra correction factor |D|κ for D being the amount of players exceeding of the maximum
level 5.
We now define an endogenous boolean game as a tuple (B, {Ti}), where B is a boolean
game and Ti is a set of transfer functions for player i, fixing both the boost factors — i.e., µi
— and a family of budget constraints {bi}i∈N such that bi(v) = −ci(v) for each player i and
outcome v, omitting them when possible to ease reading.
Now we can define a quasi-dichotomous utility function for boolean games with side-
payments.
Definition 14 (Utility) Let B be a boolean game, β a (boolean) transfer function and  ∈ R+
a sufficiently small positive real. The utility function uβ(B) : N × V → R assigning to each
player the payoff u
β(B)
i (v) he receives at valuation v is defined as follows.
u
β(B)
i (v) =

+ µi − (ci(v) + βi(v) + κ) if v |= γi
−(ci(v) + βi(v) + κ) otherwise
where κ is defined as in the general case.
The definition basically says that at outcomes — i.e., valuations — satisfying players’
goals, players sum to their costs and the appropriately corrected transfers made also an extra
factor +µi. For the other outcomes instead, players receive their costs plus the appropriately
corrected transfers made. The definition shows the specificity of boolean games, where players
are cost-minimizers but never favour a cheap choice that does not reach a goal to an expensive
one that instead does. Therefore, the expression ui(v) is always strictly positive in case v |= γi
and never strictly positive otherwise.
Using the results in [WEKL13] we can transfer the following results to our framework.
Proposition 15 (Complexity of finding equilibria) Let B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N )
be a boolean game and ϕ a boolean formula constructed on Φ. The following hold:
1. The problem of verifying whether, for β ∈∏i∈N Bi and v ∈ V , v ∈ NE(β(B)) is co-NP
complete;
5In the original article [Tur13] the correction factor was simply κ. This further modification allows to make
players individually responsible for their simultaneous maximum excess and to break ties. In any case, the
results of [Tur13] all carry over to this framework.
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2. The problem of verifying whether some boolean transfer function β and outcome v ∈
NE(β(B)) exist such that v |= ϕ is Σ2p complete;
3. The problem of verifying whether some boolean transfer function β exists such that
NE(β(B)) 6= ∅ and for all v′ ∈ NE(β(B)) we have that v′ |= ϕ is Σ2p complete.
Proof.
The proofs of [WEKL13, Proposition 1], [WEKL13, Proposition 6], [WEKL13, Proposition
14] immediately carry over to our case.
The following section carries out an equilibium analysis of endogenous games with goals
in the full-blown two-phase game.
4 Equilibrium analysis
The classical results on equilibrium survival for the case of endogenous games [JW05] are
centred on the notion of solo payoff, i.e., the payoff that a single player i can guarantee if the
opponents −i do not make any transfer.
Definition 16 (Solo payoff) Let E(ω) = ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) be an endogenous game
with goals instantiated by a boost factor profile ω. The solo payoff sˆi for player i, where sup
is the least upper bound operator, is
sˆ
E(ω)
i = supτi(minρ∈NE∆((τi,τ0−i)(E(ω))E
(τi,τ
0−i)(E(ω))(ρ))
In words, the solo payoff of player i is given by the best transfer i can make, under the
expectation that his opponents will not make any transfer and will play the worst for i Nash
equilibrium in each subgame. When the underlying game is fixed and no confusion can arise,
we use the notation sˆi.
Two important facts are known for endogenous games [JW05]:
1. when N ≤ 2, a Nash equilibrium survives if and only if each player gets at least his solo
payoff;
2. when N > 2, every pure strategy Nash equilibrium survives.
It is not obvious at all that the stability results carry over to our case, due to the elaborated
construction of the utility function (Definition 14). In fact we can show that the second
statement does not hold for endogenous games with goals.
Proposition 17 There exists an endogenous game with goals E(ω) with more than 2 players
and Nash equilibrium outcome σ of E(ω) that is not a surviving equilibrium.
Proof.
Consider the strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ) where S = ({A,B,C}, {Σi}i∈{A.B,C}, pi),
and where GB = GC = ∅, GA = {σ∗A, σ∗B, σ∗C}, pii(σ) = 0 for all i ∈ N, σ ∈ Σ. Clearly each
(σ∗A, σ
∗
B, σ
′
C) for σ
′
C 6= σ∗C is a Nash equilibrium. However it is not a surviving one. For sup-
pose it was and take (τ, (σ∗A, σ
∗
B, σ
′
C)) to be the strategy played on the equilibrium path. Now
for each payoff that player C is getting at (τ, (σ∗A, σ
∗
B, σ
′
C)) player A is better off deviating to
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a transfer τ ′A such that τ
′
A(C, σ
∗) > piτC(σ
∗
A, σ
∗
B, σ
′
C) − piτC(σ∗A, σ∗B, σ∗C), making it worthwhile
for C to satisfy A’s goal.
The idea of the proof is quite simple: when goal realization is at stake, players could go to
any length to have it satisfied. So Nash equilibria of the initial game will not survive if a joint
deviation of a group of players satisfies the goal of some other player without compromising
their own. Figure 5 illustrates one more such scenario.
L R
U 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
D 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
1
L R
U 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
D 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
2
Figure 5: A three player game, with the third player choosing the matrix to be played. Row
wants (U,L, 1) to be realized and, no matter what the distribution of payoffs after the pre-
play phase looks like, he is willing to compensate the other players to go along that strategy.
Notice that Row’s deviation in the pre-play phase is effective, as it does not compromise the
opponents’ goals. The Nash equilibrium outcome (D,R, 2) is not surviving.
Proposition 17 is of fundamental importance, not only because it shows that there is a
boolean game with |N | > 2 where a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is not surviving, at
odds with well-known results for the strategic games case, but because Propositions 5, 6,
7 were suggesting a straightforward correspondence between strategic games and strategic
games with goals. The reason of this imbalance was already hinted at by Proposition 11,
which showed how the application of the same transfer function to a strategic game and to its
corresponding strategic game with goals was not guaranteed to yield corresponding structures.
Proposition 17 uses the same idea to show that dynamic factors such as transfer functions
are enough to falsify fundamental results for the otherwise statically correspondent strategic
games.
With boost factors in Ω ↑, it is also interesting to notice that, for outcomes that are
uniquely shared joint goal among players, i.e., for outcomes σ for which σ ∈ ⋂i∈N Gi and for
which (σ′i, σ−i) 6∈ Gi unless (σ′i, σ−i) = σ, we have that σ is always a surviving equilibrium.
Proposition 18 Let E(ω) be an endogenous game with goals instantiated by a boost factor
profile ω ∈ Ω ↑. Then every outcome σ, for which σ ∈ ⋂i∈N Gi and for which (σ′iσ−i) 6∈ Gi
unless (σ′i, σ−i) = σ, we have that σ is always a surviving equilibrium.
Proof. Straightforward
Also, in spite of the negative result discussed above, we are still able to show a sufficient
condition for pure strategy Nash equilibria to survive in certain strategic games with goals,
independently of the number of players involved.
Proposition 19 (Survival) Let (S, {Gi}i∈N ) be strategic game with goals and let it be in-
stantiated by a boost factor profile ω. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium σ of S survives
whenever ui(σ) ≥ sˆi for each i ∈ N .
Proof.
We need to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-phase game where σ is
played. On the equilibrium path let players play the profile (τ0, σ). Off the equilibrium
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path, if a single player deviates from τ0 pick the worst Nash equilibrium for that player and
have that played in the continuation. If more than a player deviates from τ0, play any Nash
equilibrium. We can observe that no player i can get more than sˆi by deviating from τ
0,
given the choices played in each subgame. Moreover σ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of
S.
What we have shown is that when a Nash equilibrium σ gives the players at least their solo
payoff then that Nash equilibrium survives. In fact the proof of the proposition shows even
more, i.e., that the players will actually obtain at least their solo payoff in that equilibrium.
The case of Boolean Games For boolean games the results are even more striking
Proposition 20 (No survival) There exist an EBG (B, {Bi}i∈N ) with |N | = 3 and {v} =
NE(β0(B)) such that:
• v |= γi, for each i ∈ N
• v is not a surviving equilibrium.
Proof.
Let B = ({1, 2, 3}, c, γ1, γ2, γ3,Φ1,Φ2,Φ3) be an EBG such that Φ1 = {p}, Φ2 = {q},
Φ3 = {r}, γ1 = p, γ2 = q, γ3 = r, c1(v¬p∧¬q∧¬r) = 10, c1(v′) = 0 for v′ 6= v¬p∧¬q∧¬r,
c1(x) = c2(x) = c3(x) for each x ∈ V . The outcome vp∧q∧r is clearly a unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. Suppose now that it is also a surviving equilibrium and that the transfer
function β is part of the solution. But then there exists some player i for which u
β(B)
i (vp∧q∧r) <
30 + . This means that i is better off deviating to a transfer function (β′i, β−i) such that
β′i(v¬p∧¬q∧¬r)+ci(v¬p∧¬q∧¬r) = 30. No matter what equilibrium will be played in the resulting
subgame, i will be boosting his payoff at vp∧q∧r to 30 + . Contradiction.
So not only have we constructed a non-surviving pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
case of more than two players, but also an outcome that is shared joint goal among all
players, which was straightforward truth for boost factor profiles ω ∈ Ω ↑ (Proposition 18).
As anticipated, with boost factor profiles in Ω ↓ players can increase their cost at non-goal
states for the sole reason of increasing their payoff at goal states, which is exactly what
happens here. Figure 6 displays once more this fact.
Sufficient conditions for survival in the case of boolean games are slightly more demanding.
Let us call an outcome v shareable if we can assign to each i with v |= γi a unique
outcome vi such that:
• for all j ∈ N , (vj ,vi−j) 6= v. In other words, we focus on outcomes that cannot be
reached from v by an individual deviation.
• for all v′ ∈ V , ∑j∈N ci(v′) ≤∑j∈N cj(vi). In other words, each player realizing a goal
in v is identified with a unique outcome where the aggregated cost is maximal.
We call it moreover potentially shareable if there exists a cost function c∗ such that
the outcome v of (N,Φ, c∗, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ) is shareable. EBGs with shareable outcomes
display the property we are after.
Proposition 21 (Survival) Let (B, {Bi}i∈N ) be an EBG. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium
v of B survives whenever v is shareable and ui(v) ≥ sˆi for each i ∈ N .
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L R
U 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
D 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
1
L R
U 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
D 0, 0, 0 10, 10, 10
2
Figure 6: A three player game, with the third player (Table) choosing the matrix to be played.
Row wants any outcome consistent with U to be realized, Column any outcome consistent
with L and Table any outcome consistent with 1. Notice that all players are in control of their
own goal satisfaction. To ease readability we avoid displaying all coalitional colours which
are, as expected, {Row,Column}, {Table, Column}, {Row,Column, Table}, {Row, Table}.
Rather, we only label the strategies corresponding to individual players’ goals. The brown
outcome (U,L, 1) is Row’s, Column’s and Table’s joint goal and happens to be a dominant
strategy equilibrium of the game. However it is not a surviving equilibrium as, no matter
what the distribution of payoffs after the pre-play phase looks like, there will always be a
player that can increase his cost at outcome (D,R, 2) for the sole reason to increase his payoff
at outcome (U,L, 1).
Proof.
We need to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-phase game where v
is played. On the equilibrium path let players play the profile (β′, v) where: [1] for all
j 6∈ {i ∈ N | v |= γi}, v′ ∈ V , we have that, for all k 6= j, β′j(v′, k) = β0j (v′, k); [2] for all
j ∈ {i ∈ N | v |= γi} we have that β′j(vj , k) = ck(vj) and β′j(v′, k) = β0j (v′, k), for all v′ 6= vj ,
k 6= j. Off the equilibrium path, if a single player deviates from β′ pick the worst Nash
equilibrium for that player and have that played in the continuation. If more than a player
deviates from β′, play any Nash equilibrium. We can observe that no player i can get more
than sˆi by deviating from β
′, given the choices played in each subgame. Moreover v is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of β′(B).
To see that there are EBGs where pure strategy Nash equilibria do survive, notice that
a large enough game, where all outcomes have zero cost for all players and where there is
a common goal, has a shareable outcome and players get at least their solo payoff in the
corresponding strategy profile. 6
5 An integrated framework
If we take the point of view of an external authority that would like a certain outcome of an
EBG to be rationally chosen by players, the question is not only whether that outcome can be
turned into a Nash equilibrium, but also whether that Nash equilibrium is bound to survive.
The purpose of this section is to generate taxation mechanisms that guarantee equilibria to
survive when players play rational transfers to one another and play rationally in the game
that is updated both with the transfers made and with the taxation mechanism.
The procedure we present takes an outcome that is consistent with players’ goals and
turns it into a surviving Nash equilibrium by appropriately employing taxation mechanisms.
Algorithm 22 steps
6The size requirement is not particularly demanding. Every boolean game with |Φi| ≥ 2 for each i has a
potentially shareable outcome. If all the costs are uniform, that outcome is also shareable.
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Input An outcome σ of an instantiated strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) with S =
(N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) and such that for each i ∈ N either σ ∈ Gi or for no σ′i we have that
(σ−i, σ′i) ∈ Gi.
Output A taxation mechanism α on S.
Steps ciao
1. Let αi(σ
′) = 0, for each i ∈ N, σ′ ∈ Σ;
2. While for some i ∈ N we have that
u
(α(S),{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
i (σ) < sˆ
((α(S),{Gi}i∈N ),{Ti}i∈N )(ω)
i ,
do αi(σ
′) := αi(σ′) + 1, for each σ′ 6= σ ∈ Σ;
3. Return α.
Proposition 23 (Survival by taxation) Let σ be an outcome of an instantiated strategic
game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) with S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) and such that for each i ∈ N either
σ ∈ Gi or for no σ′i we have that (σ−i, σ′i) ∈ Gi. There exists a taxation mechanism α such
that σ is a surviving equilibrium of ((α(S), {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω).
Proof.
To see that Algorithm 22 guarantees this fact we only need to observe that the construction
of α at step 1 and step 2 ensures that the payoff u
(α(S),{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
i (σ) will eventually reach
sˆ
((α(S),{Gi}i∈N ),{Ti}i∈N )(ω)
i .
For the case of boolean games we need slightly more reasoning effort, showing that the
property of shareability is preserved.
Proposition 24 (Survival by taxation (Boolean Games)) Let v be potentially share-
able outcome of a boolean game B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ) such that for each i either
v |= γi or for no v′i we have that (v−i, v′i) |= γi. There exists a taxation mechanism α such
that v is a surviving equilibrium of the EBG (α(B), {Bi}i∈N ).
Proof. To see that Algorithm 22 guarantees this fact we only need to observe that the
construction of α at step 1 ensures that the outcome v of game α(B) is shareable, and the
update of α at step 2 ensures that the payoff u
α(B)
i (v) will eventually reach sˆ
(α(B),{Bi}i∈N )
i
while keeping v shareable.
6 Variants: lexicographic preferences over mixed strategies
As already argued in the introductory section, the definition of expected utility is ill-formed
when utilities range over extended reals, i.e., the set R ∪∞, due to the existence of strategy
profiles associated with infinite utility.
In this section we present a fairly reasonable notion of preference over mixed strategies
that takes the infinitary nature of goal states into account, and argue, consistently with many
results already available in the literature, that to analyze this type of preferences we need to
go beyond the realm of normal form games.
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L R
U 0, 0 0, 0
D 1, 0 0, 0
Figure 7: Lexicographic preference over mixed strategies and no mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium
Definition 25 (Lexicographic prefence over mixed strategies) Let (S, {Gi}) be a strate-
gic game with goals and let Gi(δ) the probability of mixed strategy profile δ assigned to profiles
in Gi. The lexicographic preference ≤LEX∆ over mixed strategies, with strict and reverse coun-
terparts denoted as usual, is defined as follows, for any two mixed strategy profiles δ, δ′ ∈ ∆
available at S:
δ ≤LEX∆i δ′ if and only if (Gi(δ) < Gi(δ′) OR (Gi(δ) = Gi(δ′) AND Ei(δ) ≤ Ei(δ′)))
In words a mixed strategy profile δ is better for i than a mixed strategy profile δ′ if:
• either the probability of reaching a i’s goal state in δ is higher than that of δ′;
• the probability of reaching i’s goal state is the same in δ and δ′ but the expected utility
for i in δ is higher than the one in δ′.
Notice that the newly defined preference is actually a total preorder.
Proposition 26 (Properties) ≤LEX∆ is transitive and complete.
Proof. Straightforward consequence of the definition.
Nevertheless it cannot be represented by a preference relation in a strategic game (in the
sense of [Rub06]), as the following result shows.
Proposition 27 There exists a strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ) with induced lexico-
graphic preference relation over mixed strategies ≤LEX∆ that is not representable by a strategic
game.
Proof.
Consider the strategic game with goals displayed in Figure 7 and consider the relation
≤LEX∆i constructed following Definition 25. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there
is a Nash equilibrium profile δ∗. Consider now the following cases
• δ∗(R) > δ∗(L), i.e., the probability for Column to play R is higher than to play L. But
then we must have that δ∗(D) > δ∗(U) as (R,D) >LEX∆Row (R,U). But if this is the case
then δ∗(L) > δ∗(R) as (L,D) >LEX∆Column (R,D). Contradiction.
• δ∗(L) > δ∗(R), similar reasoning. Contradiction.
• δ∗(L) = δ∗(R). But then we must have that δ∗(D) > δ∗(U) as ((0.5L; 0.5R), U) <LEX∆Row
((0.5L; 0.5R), D). But then again δ∗ cannot be an equilibrium unless δ∗(L) < δ∗(R).
Contradiction.
21
In conclusion, δ∗ is not a Nash equilibrium. Contradiction. Now the fact that (S, {Gi}i∈N )
with induced lexicographic preference relation over mixed strategies ≤LEX∆i is not repre-
sentable by a strategic game follows from Nash’s theorem [Nas50].
The proposition shows that the adoption of the extremely natural preference relation
≤LEX∆i induces structures that are not amenable to standard equilibrium analysis.
We consider this a double-edged result. On the one hand, ≤LEX∆i seems to us an extremely
natural preference relation that is worth considering, even at the cost of sacrificing standard
game-theoretic analysis. On the other hand, the fact that ≤LEX∆i is not in general analyzable
within the framework of normal form games does not enable a connection and a comparison
with relevant results in the field, such as Jackson and Wilkie’s endogenous games, which rely
on the existence of Nash equilibria in their two-phase game, and a whole host of theoretical
effort devoted to the study of pre-play negotiations and similar setups [EP11, Kal81, Gut78,
Gut87, Var94b, Var94a, Far98, Mas94].
The following results show that ≤LEX∆i is otherwise rather well-behaved.
Proposition 28 Let IESDS(S, {Gi}i∈N ) be the procedure of iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies applied to (S, {Gi}i∈N ) using the preference relation ≤LEX∆i and IEWDS(S, {Gi}i∈N )
its weak variant.
• If (S ′, {G′i}i∈N ) is an outcome of IESDS(S, {Gi}i∈N ), then δ is Nash equilibrium of
(S, {Gi}i∈N ) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of (S ′, {G′i}i∈N );
• If (S, {Gi}i∈N ) is solved by IESDS then the resulting joint strategy is a unique Nash
equilibrium of (S, {Gi}i∈N );
• If (S ′, {G′i}i∈N ) is an outcome of IEWDS(S, {Gi}i∈N ), and δ is Nash equilibrium of
(S ′, {G′i}i∈N ) then it is a Nash equilibrium of (S, {Gi}i∈N );
• If (S, {Gi}i∈N ) is solved by IESDS then the resulting joint strategy is a Nash equilib-
rium of (S, {Gi}i∈N ).
Proof.
The proof follows the standard procedure. The reader is referred to [Apt11] for more
detail.
7 Conclusion
We have studied strategic games where players are endowed with designated goal states and
with the possibility of offering side-payments to their fellow players in order to influence
their decision-making. The perspective we have taken integrates the framework of strategic
games with goals, a generalization of the boolean games studied in artificial intelligence,
with that of endogenous games with side-payment,s studied in game theory. We have seen
that the resulting games display specific properties that make them worth studying in their
own sake (Propositions 5, 6, 7 and 11) and the classical results available on Nash equilibria
survival do not generalize (Proposition 17). We have however provided sufficient conditions
that Nash equilibria need to have in order to survive (Proposition 21), independently of the
number of players involved. We have also shown that, with an appropriate use of taxation
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mechanisms, every outcome consistent with players’ goals can be turned into a surviving
Nash equilibrium (Algorithm 22). Future research efforts will be devoted to studying the
interaction between side-payments in strategic games with goals and more realistic taxation
mechanism that carry out imperfect redistribution of wealth, i.e., extract payoff units to some
players at certain outcomes redistributing a part of it to possibly different players at possibly
different outcomes. Attention will also be paid to the relation with mechanism design and
the algorithmic properties of the procedures under study.
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